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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, a non-citizen facing removal to his or her
native country may seek a withdrawal or deferral of removal if the
individual believes that he or she will be subjected to torture upon
return. 1 This legal right stems from the international obligations set
forth in the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the
“Convention” or “CAT”), which obligates Member States to outlaw
the use of torture both at home and abroad. 2 As a signatory to the
Convention, the United States agrees to, among other things, not
“expel, return, or extradite” aliens to another country where they
would be tortured. 3
CAT has been in effect in the United States since 1994 and,
since that time, has been the subject of a litany of judicial decisions. 4
Only recently, however, have courts been forced to grapple with the
concept of volition—i.e., free will (or lack thereof)—in determining
whether to grant CAT relief to a particular applicant. By and large,
See discussion infra Part II.C.
MICHAEL J. GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL 32276, THE U.N.
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: OVERVIEW OF U.S. IMPLEMENTATION POLICY
CONCERNING THE REMOVAL OF ALIENS 1 (2009).
3
Id.
4
Comm. Against Torture, Considerations of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 19 of the Convention: United States of America, ¶3 U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Feb. 9, 2000).
1
2
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these cases revolve around applicants who allege that they will be
tortured for (1) exercising their political rights; (2) openly identifying
as LGBTQ; or (3) exhibiting drug-addictive behavior. 5 In each
scenario, courts must grapple with the elusive question of free will, and
specifically whether a person should be denied CAT relief on the
ground that he or she could simply refrain from conduct that will likely
elicit a torturous response.
Broadly speaking, courts in the United States have granted
CAT relief to petitioners who fall within either of the first two
categories. It remains to be seen, however, whether courts will be as
willing to grant CAT relief to individuals who submit credible evidence
that they will be tortured upon removal to a foreign territory due to a
drug addiction. To date, the only federal court to have been presented
with the latter question is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. Although the court never reached the merits of the case at
issue, it signaled a willingness to grant CAT relief to an application
afflicted by drug addiction. 6
In this Article, I explore the ramifications of the Third Circuit’s
decision, and offer an analysis as to why federal courts should not
hesitate to grant CAT relief to those who suffer from drug addiction
so long as the requisite legal standards are satisfied. I begin first with
an overview of the events that led to the United Nations’ promulgation
of CAT in 1984. I then turn to the manner in which CAT is applied in
the United States, focusing specifically on how appellate courts have
interpreted its various prescriptions in cases concerning political
speech, sexual orientation, and drug addiction. Finally, I use the Third
Circuit’s decision as a starting point for a broader discussion of free
will and freedom of choice.

5
6

See discussion infra Part III.A.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Predating the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Punishment
i. Post-World War II Developments
On September 2, 1945, Japanese representatives signed the
official Instrument of Surrender, marking the formal capitulation of
Japan to the Allied Powers and, consequently, the end of World War
II. 7 Weeks later, on October 24, 1945, the Charter of the United
Nations (“Charter”) was ceremoniously enacted, and, along with it, the
inauguration of the world’s largest intergovernmental alliance. 8 The
United Nations (“UN”)—avowing to “save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war” 9—dedicated itself to the goal of achieving
“international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character.” 10
In the immediate wake of the deadliest conflict in human
history, the UN proceeded expeditiously, and, within two months of
its inception, promulgated the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the “Genocide
11

Instrument of Surrender, Sept. 2, 1945, 3 U.S.T. 1251, 139 U.N.T.S. 387,
https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured-documents/japanese-surrenderdocument (last visited Feb. 23, 2019).
8
International Organizations on the Web, THE WASHINGTON POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/intorgs.htm (last visited
Oct. 4, 2015).
9
U.N. Charter pmbl., http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/uncharter-full-text/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2019).
10
Id. at art. 1, para. 3.
11
World War II History, THE NATIONAL WORLD WAR II MUSEUM,
http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-history/
(last visited October 15, 2015).
7
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Convention”). 12 As the first human rights treaty adopted by the UN, 13
the legally-binding Genocide Convention focused on the universal
protection of “national, ethnical, racial [and] religious” groups, 14 and
further underscored the importance of international cooperation in
order to “liberate mankind from [the] odious scourge” of genocide. 15
As the first treaty to explicitly define genocide as an
“international crime,” 16 the Genocide Convention was a monumental
achievement. Yet for many scholars, the Genocide Convention is not
the UN’s most significant enactment; instead, scholars bestow that
honor upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)
of 1948. Famously characterized by Eleanor Roosevelt as the
“international Magna Carta for all mankind,” 17 the UDHR represents
the first “occasion on which the organized community of nations had
made a declaration of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 18
Perhaps most significantly, the UDHR was the first international edict
to specifically outlaw the use of torture: “No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 19

12
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, S. Exec. Doc. O, 81-1 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter
Genocide Convention].
13
William Schabas, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008),
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cppcg/cppcg.html.
14
Genocide Convention, supra note 12, art. 2.
15
Id. pmbl.
16
RALPH A. WEISHEIT & FRANK MORN, PURSUING JUSTICE: TRADITIONAL
AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN OUR COMMUNITIES AND THE WORLD 148 (2014).
17
Press Release, Amnesty International UK, Hampton Court Garden
Celebrates Magna Carta as Human Rights Act Under Threat (June 8, 2015) (on file
with author).
18
JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING AND INTENT 12 (1999) (quoting H.V. Evatt in the
United Nations General Assembly Record, December 10, 1948, 934).
19
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948).
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A groundbreaking enactment, the UDHR has paved the way for the
adoption of more than seventy human rights treaties worldwide. 20
ii. Use of Torture During the Cold War Era
Unfortunately, however, the germinal phase of the UN’s
human rights movement did little to combat the practice of
governmentally-authorized torture; indeed, nations around the world,
from the authoritarian to the democratic, continued to “view torture
as a mechanism for maintaining political control.” 21
One such country was the United States. Fueled by the hypercompetitive atmosphere of the Cold War era, the Central Intelligence
Agency (“CIA”), in 1963, went so far as to adopt the practice of torture
as an official intelligence-gathering tool—a decision that stemmed
from the government’s belief that “Russian and Chinese intelligence
services had developed sophisticated tactics that could undermine U.S.
intelligence-gathering efforts.” 22 As set forth in the KUBARK
Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual (the “KUBARK Manual”),
the CIA took the position that the goal of coercion was not to inflict
pain, but instead “to induce regression” and break down prisoners’
defenses. 23 To that end, interrogators were taught to employ “coercive
techniques of interrogation,” including: “arrest, detention, deprivation
of sensory stimuli through solitary confinement or similar methods,
threats and fear, debility, pain, heightened suggestibility and hypnosis,

20
Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
LIBRARY
OF
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
(2008),
AUDIOVISUAL
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/udhr/udhr.html
21
Matthew Lipman, The Development and Drafting of the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
17 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 275, 290 (1994).
22
JOAN HOFF, A FAUSTIAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM WOODROW WILSON
TO GEORGE W. BUSH: DREAMS OF PERFECTIBILITY 116 (2007); Jamie Mayerfield,
Playing by Our Own Rules: How U.S. Marginalization of International Human Rights Law Led
to Torture, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 89, 98 (2007).
23
CIA, KUBARK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION 12 (1963), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/#kubark
nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/index.htm#kubark [hereinafter KUBARK
Manual]
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narcosis and induced regression.” 24 According to the KUBARK
Manual, these methods would generate “feelings of guilt and
dependence in the prisoner as part of a relationship with the
interrogator.” 25 Once this relationship was established, the Manual
instructed, the vulnerable prisoner would reveal valuable
information. 26
iii. The United Nations Declaration on Torture
On December 9, 1975, the UN General Assembly took a
historic step toward the eradication of torture when it adopted the first
international condemnation of torture: 27 The Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Declaration
on Torture”). 28 Although the Declaration on Torture is non-binding,
the UN called upon Member States to make “unilateral declarations
expressing their intent to comply with the United Nations Declaration
on Torture.” 29
Despite the UN’s efforts, however, the non-binding
Declaration on Torture was largely ineffective. While it is true that it
led to a few notable achievements—e.g., the establishment of the
United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, which assisted

24
Linda Qiu, Haspel Says C.I.A. ‘Historically’ Has Not Interrogated Subjects.
History Shows Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018).
25
Id. KUBARK Manual, supra note 23, at 85.
26
John Parry, Torture Nation, Torture Law, 97 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1010 (2009)
(citing KUBARK Manual, supra note 23, at 83). The practice of torture was certainly
not limited to the United States. In 1954, for example, French forces tortured
Algerian detainees to gather information about the Algerian National Liberation
Front’s organization, membership, and use of the guerilla forces. See PIERRE VIDALNAQUET, TORTURE: CANCER OF DEMOCRACY–FRANCE AND ALGERIA
1954-1962 80-82 (1963).
27
Lipman, supra note 21, at 303.
28
G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), The Declaration on the Protection of all Persons
from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, at 91 (Dec. 9, 1975) [hereinafter Declaration Against Torture]
29
See G.A. Res. 32/64, at 137 (Dec. 8, 1977).
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the victims of governmental abuse 30—the fact remained that, as of
1980, “more than a third of the world’s governments . . . used or
tolerated torture or ill-treatment of prisoners.” 31
In 1984, the UN’s axiomatic failure in this regard was revealed
when Amnesty International released a report (the “Amnesty Report”)
detailing more than 3,500 individual allegations of torture across
ninety-eight countries between 1974 and 1983. 32 Damningly, the
Amnesty Report categorized torture as being “part of the statecontrolled machinery to suppress dissent,” 33 a practice that affected
“all social classes, age groups, trades and professions.” 34 Citing the
Genocide Convention’s success in “outlawing genocide for all time,”
Amnesty International strongly urged the UN to adopt the then-draft
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, which Amnesty believed would be “a truly
effective weapon against torture.” 35
B. Critical Provisions of the UN’s Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
The UN General Assembly formally adopted the Convention
Against Torture on December 10, 1984—just a few months after the
publication of the Amnesty Report. 36 After ratification by the requisite
twenty States, the Convention entered into force on June 26, 1987. 37

30
By February 1990, the Fund had accumulated contributions and pledges
of roughly $350,000. See United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture,
Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/16 (Feb. 26, 1990).
31
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES 2-3
(1984) [hereinafter Amnesty Report].
32
Id.
33
Lipman, supra note 21, at 309.
34
Amnesty Report, supra note 31, at 9.
35
Id. at 3.
36
Hans Danelius, Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, AUDIOVISUAL
LIBRARY
OF
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
(2008),
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/catcidtp/catcidtp.html
37
Id.
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The following sections provide an overview of the Convention’s
principal provisions.
i.

Definition of Torture

Article 1 of CAT defines torture as “any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on a person . . . by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.” 38 This definition does not include “pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” 39 CAT Article
2 further makes clear that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever,”
including a state of war or any other public emergency, may be invoked
to justify torture. 40
ii. Jurisdiction
With regard to jurisdiction, the issue prior to CAT’s official
adoption was whether “each State should undertake, in respect of
torture, to assume jurisdiction not only based on territory or the
offender’s nationality but also over acts of torture committed outside
its territory by persons not being its nationals.” 41 Ultimately, the UN
General Assembly embraced the principle of universal jurisdiction, 42
pursuant to which each State is obligated to retain jurisdiction over

38
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
39
Id. art. 1.
40
Id. art. 2. Article 2 states, in full:
(1) Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction;
(2) No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification of torture.
(3) An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a
justification of torture.
41
Danelius, supra note 36.
42
Id.
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cases in which the “alleged offender is present in [its] territory[,]” lest
there be cause for extradition under Article 8. 43
iii. International Implementation
Because the effectiveness of CAT was largely dependent upon
its implementation at the international level, the General Assembly
decided to implement, through Article 17, a Committee Against
Torture to be responsible for performing a number of essential
duties. 44 Among other things, these duties included: commenting on
states parties’ periodic reports on the measures taken to ensure
compliance with the Convention; 45 initiating an investigation when
reliable information indicates that torture is being “systematically
practi[c]ed in the territory of a [s]tate [p]arty[;]” 46 examining complaints
by one state party alleging violations of the Convention by another
state party; 47 and examining applications by individuals claiming to be
victims of a violation of the Convention by a state party. 48
iv. State Party Responsibilities
While several provisions delineate State Party responsibilities
under CAT, 49 two Articles are particularly salient for purposes of this
discussion. First, Article 14 unequivocally and unambiguously requires
each State Party to ensure that any victim of an act of torture is
provided with a legal right to obtain redress as well as fair and adequate
compensation. 50 In contrast to other CAT provisions, Article 14
applies extraterritorially, meaning that all victims—regardless of their
nationality—must be afforded legal protection from torture. 51

CAT art. 5, para. 2.
Danelius, supra note 36.
45
CAT art. 19.
46
Id. art. 20.
47
Id. art. 21.
48
Id. art. 22.
49
See generally id. arts. 2, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 20, 21, 22.
50
Id. art. 14.
51
Christopher K. Hall, The Duty of States Parties to the Convention against Torture
to Provide Procedures Permitting Victims to Recover Reparations for Torture Committed Abroad,
18 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 921, 923 (2007).
43
44
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Second, Article 3, which operates via the domestic procedural
obligations imposed under Article 14, is especially relevant because it
prohibits the expulsion, return, or extradition of “a person to another
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he [or she]
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” 52 Article 3(1) is of
paramount importance because it is the only CAT provision that
expressly obliges a state party to address torture committed abroad. 53
Additionally, in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to
conclude that an individual would be in danger of being subjected to
torture in a foreign country, Article 3(2) requires state parties to
examine “all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the
existence in the state concerned of a consistent pattern of gross,
flagrant or mass violations of human rights.” 54
As will be explored in detail below, courts in the United States
most often apply Article 3’s provisions in situations where an alien or
temporary permanent resident has committed certain crimes that
subject the individual to removal to his or her native country.
C. The Convention Against Torture as applied in the United States
i. The United States’ Implementation of CAT
The United States, under the authority of President Ronald
Reagan, signed CAT on April 18, 1988; however, it did not become
legally binding until the Senate ratified the Treaty six years later, on
October 21, 1994. 55 Notably, the ratified version contained certain
provisions that differed from language contained in the original UN
Convention, “including a declaration that CAT Articles 1 through 16
were not self-executing, and therefore required domestic

CAT art. 3, para. 1 (emphasis added).
Hall, supra note 51, at 925.
54
CAT art. 3, para. 2.
55
Office of the Press Secretary, Message to the Senate Transmitting the
Convention Against Torture and Inhuman Treatment or Punishment, May 20, 1988,
RONALD REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT:
RONALD
REAGAN
(1981–1989)
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/052088f(last visited February 23, 2019);
Garcia, supra note 2, at 3.
52
53
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implementing legislation.” 56 As such, the United States’
implementation of CAT differs in several important respects from the
criterions initially set forth by the UN.
ii. CAT Principles as Set Forth Under U.S. Law
Under U.S. law, “torture” is defined, in part, as “severe pain or
suffering (physical or mental) that is intentionally inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official,
or other person acting in an official capacity.” 57 This articulation is
essentially the same as that prescribed in CAT Article 1, although, in
practice, the definition has come to connote an “extreme” form of
cruel and inhumane punishment that “does not include lesser forms of
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment . . . .” 58 Under this
interpretation, “police brutality,” for example, does not amount to
torture for purposes of the Convention. 59
Generally speaking, CAT-based regulations concerning the
removal of aliens from the United States are covered under §§ 208.16208.18 and 1208.16-1208.18 of title 8 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (“C.F.R.”). Notably, CAT Article 3 is codified in 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.18(a)(1), which states that torture includes, inter alia, acts
committed by or at the acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. 60 This section is vital because, in order to
obtain CAT relief in the United States, individuals subject to removal
need not show that foreign persons operating under the color of
56
A “non-self-executing agreement will not be given effect as law in the
absence of necessary implementation”). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 (1987).
57
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FACT SHEET: ASYLUM AND
WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL RELIEF CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
PROTECTIONS,
(2009),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2009/01/23/AsylumWith
holdingCATProtections.pdf [hereinafter “DOJ Fact Sheet”].
58
8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a). See also Garcia, supra note 2, at 2.
59
Garcia, supra note 2, at 2.
60
8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). See also SEN. EXEC. RPT. 101-30, Resolution of
Advice and Consent to Ratification, Art. II(1)(b) (1990) [hereinafter “Sen.
Resolution”].
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extraterritorial law directly engaged in tortuous conduct; rather, it is
sufficient for CAT purposes to proffer evidence that a public official
had “awareness of such activity and thereafter breached his or her legal
responsibility to intervene [and] prevent” it from occurring. 61 This
understanding is echoed in an array of federal and administrative
decisions, which state that, in order to demonstrate “acquiescence” on
the part of state officials, an individual seeking CAT relief must
demonstrate “willful blindness” by foreign officials with regard to
tortuous conduct. 62
In terms of applying CAT Article 3 to petitions for relief, the
Senate decided that reprieve is justified under circumstances in which
it would be “more likely than not” that an alien would be tortured upon
removal to a foreign country. 63 To obtain CAT relief, an applicant
bears the burden of proffering sufficient evidence to allow an
immigration judge (“IJ”) to find that “a greater than fifty percent
chance of torture” will occur upon removal. 64 This undertaking often
requires the claimant to not only tender testimony on his or her own
behalf, but to further proffer supplementary evidence—generally in
the form of expert testimony—regarding the use of torture in his or
her native country.
In assessing whether it is “more likely than not” that an
applicant would be tortured upon removal to the proposed country,
courts are required to consider all evidence relevant to the possibility
of future torture, including: (1) evidence of past torture inflicted upon
the applicant; (2) a pattern or practice of gross human rights violations

Id.
See, e.g., Silva-Rengifo v. Atty. Gen. of United States, 473 F.3d 58, 70 (3d
Cir. 2007) (“[A]cquisence to torture requires only that the government remain
willfully blind to tortuous conduct and breach their legal responsibility to prevent
it.”); Rodriguez Morales v. United States Atty. Gen., 488 F.3d 884 (11th Cir.
2007)(explaining that “acquiescence” to torture means that the government was
aware of the torture, yet breached its responsibility to intervene).
63
Sen. Resolution, supra note 60 at Art. II(2).
64
Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1145 n. 16 (9th Cir. 2010)(citing Wakkary
v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1067–68 (9th Cir.2009); Khup v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 898, 907
(9th Cir.2004)).
61
62
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within the proposed country of removal; and (3) other relevant
information regarding conditions in the country of removal. 65
iii. Grounds for Removal
Broadly speaking, aliens may be subject to removal from the
United States in two primary scenarios, namely where the applicant:
(1) is deemed in admissible at the time of entry to the United States or
(2) has committed certain criminal offenses, i.e., crimes involving moral
turpitude, controlled substance violations, firearm offenses, aggravated
felonies, or crimes of domestic violence. 66
iv. CAT Protections
CAT provides two types of protections—(i) withholding of
removal and (ii) deferral of removal—both of which ensure that aliens

65
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). “In assessing whether it is more likely than not
that an applicant would be tortured in the proposed country of removal, all evidence
relevant to the possibility of future torture shall be considered, including, but not
limited to:
(i)§ 1208.16(c)(3)(i) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant;
(ii)§ 1208.16(c)(3)(ii) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the
country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured;
(iii)§ 1208.16(c)(3)(iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights
within the country of removal, where applicable; and
(iv)§ 1208.16(c)(3)(iv) Other relevant information regarding conditions in the
country of removal.”
66
See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a), which states, in full: Any alien (including an alien
crewman) in and admitted to the United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney
General, be removed if the alien is within one or more of the following classes of
deportable aliens:
1)Is deemed inadmissible at time of entry or is found to have violated adjustment of
status conditions;
(2)Committed certain criminal offenses, i.e., crimes involving moral turpitude,
controlled substance violations, firearm offenses, aggravated felonies, or crimes of
domestic violence;
(3)Failed to register a change in address or criminal conviction or falsified
documents;
(4)Is found to be a national security threat;
(5)Has become a public charge subsequent to entry; and
(6)Violated voting laws
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are not to be returned to a country where they would face torture. 67
The former represents a more secure form of CAT protection
compared to the second because the IJ’s decision to withhold (as
opposed to merely defer) removal signifies that the petitioner will not,
at any time, be returned to his or her native country. 68
Deferral of removal also prohibits the removal of aliens to a
specific country where they would face torture, but, as the name
suggests, constitutes a temporary form of protection in that relief can
be terminated if it is later determined that an alien is no longer likely
to be tortured in the country of removal. 69 In a similar vein, relief may
be withdrawn if the U.S. government receives diplomatic assurances
that the alien will not be tortured upon removal. 70 Oftentimes, deferral
of removal is granted to aliens whose crimes fall under the provisions
requiring mandatory denial of withholding of removal, e.g., certain
criminals and persecutors. 71
v. Immigration Judge Standard of Review
Because the very nature of CAT relief is prognostic, claimants
petitioning for relief must submit a presumptive chain of events that
carry a high likelihood of occurring upon removal. Under the standard
set forth in In Re J.F.F., 23 I. & N. Dec. 912 (A.G. 2006), an
immigration judge must assess the probability that the proffered chain
of events—taken together—will more likely than not result in torture.
As set out below, such an undertaking is, by its very nature, speculative,
as it calls for a prediction as to what is likely to happen if a petitioner
is removed.
First, the IJ must conduct an inquiry into whether the evidence
supports a finding that “each step in [the [proposed] hypothetical chain
of events is more likely than not to happen.” 72 If the IJ determines that
the totality of evidence supports such a finding, then the IJ proceeds
67
68
69
70
71
72

See DOJ Fact Sheet, supra note 57.
See id.
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(d)(3).
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(f).
DOJ Fact Sheet, supra note 57; 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(d)(2)–(3).
In Re J.F.F., 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 912 (A.G. 2006).
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to the second prong of the analysis. It is essential to recognize,
however, that while this first step connotes a necessary condition for
granting CAT relief, it is not, in and of itself, sufficient for doing so. 73
The IJ’s calculation under the second prong of the JFF
standard essentially effectuates the IJ’s ultimate conclusion to either
grant or deny CAT relief, as this analysis requires the IJ to determine
whether the “likelihood of all necessary events coming together” is “more
likely than not [to] lead to torture. . . .” 74 In this regard, the IJ must
view the entire causal chain in the aggregate and determine whether
the likelihood of an alien being subjected to torture is greater than fifty
percent. 75 Thus, if the IJ concludes that each individual link is more
likely than not to occur, and the likelihood of these links coming
together and leading to torture is greater than fifty percent, then CAT
relief may be granted. 76
vi. Appellate Standard of Review
In essence, an IJ’s inquiry regarding the likelihood of torture is
a mixed inquiry of fact and law. 77 When the IJ makes a determination
as to what is likely to happen if a petitioner is removed, the court is
resolving a factual question. 78 On the other hand, if the IJ concludes
that, based upon the evidence presented, what is likely to happen if
removal occurs amounts to a form of torture, then the IJ is resolving a legal
question. 79
Upon review, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) must
evaluate the IJ’s factual determination for clear error, but may review

See id. at 918 n. 4 (“An alien will never be able to show that he faces a
more likely than not chance of torture if one link in the chain cannot be shown to be
more likely than not to occur. It is the likelihood of all necessary events coming
together that must more likely than not lead to torture, and a chain of events cannot
be more likely than its least likely link.”).
74
Id. (emphasis added).
75
See id.
76
See id.
77
See, e.g., Kaplun v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010).
78
See id.
79
See id.
73
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the IJ’s legal conclusion de novo. 80 A Court of Appeals, meanwhile,
retains jurisdiction over constitutional claims and questions of law
only. 81
III. ANALYSIS
A. Case Law Discussion: Torture on the Basis of Exercising
Individual Rights
As a general rule, courts tend to grant CAT relief to aliens who
present sufficient evidence that, upon removal, they will be unable to
refrain from certain conduct and thereby be subjected to torture. Cases
in this category center on instances in which an individual claims (1)
that he or she will be tortured for exercising a certain fundamental
right—e.g., freedom of speech—or (2) will be subjected to torture due
to his or her sexual predisposition.
In Edu v. Holder, for example, a woman named Edu faced
removal to her native country of Nigeria after being convicted of
assault with a deadly weapon in California. 82 During her hearing before
the IJ, Edu stated that, prior to coming to the United States, she had
been “detained, raped and beaten by [Nigerian] police or military in
response” to protesting the Nigerian government’s failure to, among
other things, provide roads and drinking water, as well as schooling
and jobs to minority graduates. 83 In seeking CAT relief, Edu
maintained that she would continue to engage in similar political
protests if removed to Nigeria, and, as a result, would be subjected to
further torture because “anybody who is associated with
demonstrating, regardless of location, will be tortured or killed.” 84
The IJ granted Edu’s request for CAT protection, but the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) reversed that decision and
ordered her removed to Nigeria. According to the BIA, Edu could

80
81
82
83
84

See id.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D).
See Edu v. Holder, supra note 64, at 1139 n. 2.
Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1140-41.
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avoid subjecting herself to torture by simply refraining from engaging
in government protests. 85 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, however, found such logic to be “an aberration . . . so
antithetical to the intent of [CAT] law that it [could not] stand,” and
accordingly reversed the BIA’s ruling. 86 In so doing, the court held that
“CAT’s precepts” afforded protection to “individuals like Edu who are
unwilling, as a matter of conscience, to give up acting on their political
beliefs.” 87
In a similar vein, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held in Ali v. Mukasey that Ali, a forty-two year old Guyanese
native and citizen, was entitled to CAT relief on the ground that it was
more likely than not that he would be tortured in his native country
due to his homosexuality. 88 At his trial before the IJ, Ali testified that
the punishment in Guyana for sodomy is life in prison, and that he
would be tortured if imprisoned for that crime. 89 The IJ, however,
denied Ali’s request for CAT relief, reasoning that no one “in Guyana
would even know that Ali was a homosexual” unless Ali did something
“explicitly homosexual,” such as find a “partner or cooperating person
. . . .” 90 Resolving that Ali failed to present evidence that he was “likely
to form such a close relationship within a foreseeable period of time,”
the IJ accordingly denied his petition for CAT relief. 91
On appeal before the Second Circuit, Ali argued that the IJ
violated his due process rights “by failing to consider all the evidence
in support of his sexual orientation-based claim.” 92 The court agreed
with Ali’s contention, opining that the IJ’s “comments reflect[ed] an
impermissible reliance on preconceived assumptions about
homosexuality and homosexuals” that intolerably amounted to “the
appearance of bias or hostility.” 93 In fact, the Second Circuit took the
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

See id. at 1141.
Id.
See Edu v. Holder, supra note 64, at 1146.
See Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 482 (2nd Cir. 2008).
See id. at 486.
Id. at 487 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 488.
Ali v. Mukasey, supra note 88, at 492.
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remarkable step of ordering that Immigration Judge Alan Vomacka be
removed from the case altogether —as the court explained, Judge
Vomacka “clearly abrogated his responsibility to function as a neutral,
impartial arbiter” by voicing “stereotypes about homosexual
orientation and the way in which homosexuals are perceived, both in
the United States and Guyana,” without “reference to any support in
the record.” 94
As these cases and others make clear, 95 courts are progressively
apprehending the importance of safeguarding aliens from the
possibility of being tortured in foreign countries for exercising of
certain rights. Underlying this trend is the notion that free will, or, at
the very least, freedom of choice, embodies a virtue so sacrosanct that
courts must take it upon themselves to ensure its protection.
B. A Look to the Future: CAT Relief and Autonomy
That said, it remains to be seen whether courts will be willing
to uphold the principle of volitional independence in the context of
drug addiction. To date, only one federal court has encountered the
question of whether a drug addiction may serve as a basis for CAT
relief—i.e., that the inability to combat addictive impulses will lead to
torture upon removal. In my view, addiction should be afforded the
same protection as the exercise of political rights or adherence to an
innate sexual predisposition; as a matter of principle, it falls within the
realm of cognitive volition, which, per recent judicial opinions, merits
protection.

Id. at 491.
See, e.g., Jean-Pierre v. AG of the United States, 500 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir.
2007) (remanding to the BIA on the grounds that “the undisputed evidence seemed
to show that [the appellant] likely would be singled out for crawl-space confinement
. . . and beatings with metal rods due to his AIDS-related mental illness and prior
felony convictions”); Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir.
2015) (holding that, because violence “continues to plague transgender women in
Mexico,” Avendano-Hernandez, a self-identified transgender woman, was entitled to
CAT protection); Doe v. Holder, 736 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the
claimant seeking CAT relief “met his burden of presenting evidence that the Russian
government was unable or unwilling to control the nongovernmental actors who
persecuted him because he was a homosexual.”).
94
95
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Thus far, the only case addressing CAT relief within the
context of drug addiction that has made its way to the federal circuit is
Kamal Jamai v. Atty. Gen. This case has its genesis in October 2013,
when the government served Kamal Jamai (“Jamai”), a 32-year-old
native and citizen of Morocco, with a notice to appear, charging him,
inter alia, as removable in light of his multiple criminal convictions. 96
Jamai conceded the charges and sought deferral of removal under
CAT. 97
Jamai has been a heroin addict since 2004. 98 At his hearing
before the IJ, Jamai argued that, because of his addiction, he would
almost certainly relapse into using heroin upon removal, which would
lead to his arrest and torture by law enforcement in Morocco. 99
To support his claim, Jamai proffered testimony summarizing
his decade-long battle with a heroin addiction, which originated out of
an opiate dependence that he developed following a dental procedure

96
See generally Jamai v. AG of the United States, No. 15-1116, 2015 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22933 (3d Cir. 2015) [herein after “Jamai”]. See also U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(iii) dealing with “Classes of Deportable Aliens: “Any alien (including an alien
crewman) in and admitted to the United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney
General, be removed if the alien is within one or more of the following classes of
deportable aliens:
(2) Criminal offenses:
(i) Crimes of moral turpitude. Any alien who-(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
committed within five years (or 10 years in the case of an alien provided lawful
permanent resident status under section 245(j) [8 USCS § 1255(j)]) after the date of
admission, and
(II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may
be imposed, is deportable.
(ii) Multiple criminal convictions. Any alien who at any time after admission
is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a
single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and
regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is deportable.
(iii) Aggravated felony. Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at
any time after admission is deportable.”
97
See Jamai, supra note 96 at *3.
98
See id.
99
See id.
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in 2004. 100 Shortly after he began abusing opiates, Jamai graduated to
using heroin and, since then, has engaged in a cyclical pattern of heroin
use, theft, temporary sobriety, and eventual relapse. 101
According to Jamai, his relapses have been triggered mainly by
stress, which he emphasized would be compounded if he were
removed to Morocco. 102 To further bolster this contention, Jamai
submitted documentary evidence describing the manner in which
heroin addiction chemically alters the brain, as well as evidence
supporting his contention that relapse is often triggered by stress. 103
An expert on Moroccan political institutions from Duke
University testified on Jamai’s behalf as well, explaining that drug
treatment resources in Morocco are not only limited and deprioritized,
but that Moroccan authorities “would more likely than not torture
Jamai” if he were to relapse into heroin use, as “the use of torture to
secure confessions for unsolved crimes . . . is prevalent in Morocco.” 104
At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ granted Jamai’s petition
for CAT relief, finding that Jamai had demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that he would be tortured if removed
to Morocco. 105 Specifically, the IJ concluded that Jamai is a heroin
addict and that each link in Jamai’s proposed chain of events was more
likely than not to occur, namely:

100
Oral Argument at 4:00, Jamai v. Atty. Gen. (No. 15-1116). Moreover, for
further reference, opioids are medications that relieve pain. Specifically, “[t]hey
reduce the intensity of pain signals reaching the brain and affect those brain areas
controlling emotion, which diminishes the effects of a painful stimulus. Medications
that fall within this class include hydrocodone (e.g., Vicodin), oxycodone (e.g.,
OxyContin, Percocet), morphine (e.g., Kadian, Avinza), codeine, and related drugs.”
INSTITUTE
ON
DRUG
ABUSE,
available
at
See
NATIONAL
http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/prescriptiondrugs/opioids/what-are-opioids
101
See Jamai, supra note 96 at *7.
102
See Jamai, supra note 96 at *3.
103
See id. at *4.
104
Id.
105
Id.
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(1) Jamai will relapse if removed to Morocco;
(2) Jamai will not seek or receive adequate treatment for his
addiction in Morocco;
(3) as a result of his addiction and lack of adequate treatment,
Jamai will be arrested by Moroccan authorities; and
(4) Jamai will be subjected to torture by the police. 106
The BIA, however, reversed the IJ’s determination, finding
Jamai’s chain of events to be “based on a string of suppositions which
are unproven on [the] record.” 107 In accordance with this conclusion,
the BIA ruled that the IJ committed “clear error” in finding it to be
“more likely than not that [Jamai] will be tortured if removed to
Morocco.” 108
Jamai subsequently petitioned the Third Circuit for review of
the BIA’s decision, arguing that the IJ’s decision to grant him CAT
relief should be reinstated. 109 On December 31, 2015, the Third Circuit
vacated the BIA’s decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings “[b]ecause the BIA did not adequately explain the

106
107

Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *5. The BIA’s reasoning for its conclusion is explained in a single

paragraph:
[T]he [IJ] determined, without adequate documentary or qualified expert witness
evidence on the issue, that it is more likely than not that [Jamai] will relapse and use
heroin in Morocco. While there is some evidence in the record concerning the
frequent relapse of heroin addicts, the record lacks testimony from a qualified expert
or documentation assessing the likelihood that a person in [Jamai’s] specific
circumstances is likely to relapse. [Jamai] has been able to refrain from using heroin
for more than 2 years and claims to fear severe consequences should he resume its
use in Morocco. Furthermore, the [IJ] assumed that [Jamai] would not seek out any
treatment that may be available to prevent such a relapse. [Jamai’s] evidence also does
not prove each step in the hypothetical chain concerning whether the authorities
would become aware of any future heroin use and arrest him, that he would then
refuse to confess his guilt, and that he thus would be tortured for the purpose of
procuring his confession.
108
Jamai, supra note 96, at *5.
109
Id. at *1.
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reasoning underlying its decision.” 110 Specifically, the court found itself
“unable to meaningfully review the BIA’s decision” because the BIA
“effectively discredited” certain evidence “without explanation.” 111
Accordingly, the court remanded Jamai’s case with instructions to the
BIA to more thoroughly explicate its analysis. 112
Unfortunately, however, the Third Circuit refrained from
opining on the merits of Jamai’s claim. Nevertheless, the three-judge
panel assigned to the case offered insight during oral argument on the
question of whether Jamai’s addiction could serve as a basis for
obtaining CAT relief. 113
In a spirited back-and-forth with counsel for the Department
of Justice, Judge Dolores Sloviter took issue with the notion that
Jamai’s drug addiction may entitle him to relief under CAT:
What is the position of the Justice Department as to
whether somebody can purposely, and of his or her own
volition get into CAT? In other words, we’re not talking
about . . . a medical condition. This is heroin, and
[Jamai] steals. These are all voluntary actions by the

Id.
Id. at *8.
112
See id.
113
For information about the assignment of judges and panels are the
appellate level, see 28 U.S. Code § 46 (b), which states:
(b) In each circuit the court may authorize the hearing and determination of cases
and controversies by separate panels, each consisting of three judges, at least a
majority of whom shall be judges of that court, unless such judges cannot sit because
recused or disqualified, or unless the chief judge of that court certifies that there is
an emergency including, but not limited to, the unavailability of a judge of the court
because of illness. Such panels shall sit at the times and places and hear the cases and
controversies assigned as the court directs. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit shall determine by rule a procedure for the rotation of judges
from panel to panel to ensure that all of the judges sit on a representative cross
section of the cases heard and, notwithstanding the first sentence of this subsection,
may determine by rule the number of judges, not less than three, who constitute a
panel.
110
111
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individual. So, is a person who voluntarily does these
things entitled to CAT? 114
Shortly thereafter—after the government respectfully declined
to speculate as to the Justice Department’s official position on the
matter of volition and drug addiction—Judge Sloviter again posited
whether drug addiction was indeed a medical issue or, contrarily,
simply a matter of volition: “Enough about calling it a disease. I’m not
sure that we can accept the fact that voluntary drug-taking is a disease
. . . This is a voluntary addict.” 115
As her statements suggest, Judge Sloviter—at least for the sake
of argument—pushed back against the notion that a criminal could
obtain CAT relief on the basis that, by engaging in criminal behavior
both willfully and voluntarily, he would consequently be tortured.
Judge Marjorie Rendell, on other hand, seemed sympathetic to
Jamai’s claim; responding to the government’s contention that “there’s
something perverse . . . about an individual’s claim for CAT protection
based on the fact that [he] is a heroin addict, steal[s], and refuses to get
treatment,” Judge Rendell countered, “we have a policy that underlies
CAT. You can be the worst criminal, and if it’s shown that you’re going
to be tortured, we will not send you to a place where you’re going to
be tortured.” 116
Here, Judge Rendell’s initial inclination seems to be that, if the
IJ finds an alien’s testimony to be credible, then the court is not in the
position to espouse its own moral judgment as to whether drug
addiction should serve as a basis for relief. Put differently, Judge
Rendell seems to be of the view that if the IJ makes a credible finding
that an individual’s medical condition may lead to he or she being
tortured upon removal, the protection afforded under CAT should not
be curtailed.
Even still, the most interesting comment made during oral
argument was that made by Judge Thomas Vanaskie. Delving into the
114
115
116

Oral Argument, supra note 100 at 33:14.
Id. at 38:19.Check.
Id. at 18:00.
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logic and seemingly philosophical rationale underlying Jamai’s claim,
Judge Vanaksie queried: “If [Jamai] were to say, ‘[when] I go back to
Morocco, there’s this person that I’m under compulsion to kill, and,
after I kill that person, I’m going to be tortured,’ would he be entitled
to Convention Against Torture relief then?” 117 Jamai’s counsel
shrewdly dodged a direct answer to the question, but nevertheless
acknowledged that “there is a volition[al]” element to Jamai’s case. 118
This statement scratches the surface of an interesting thought
experiment: what are the potential consequences of allowing a criminal
to rely upon neurological impulses and compulsions as a basis for
arguing against removal? If the court were to grant Jamai CAT relief
on the premise that, because of his prolonged heroin addiction, he will
be unable to refrain from similar addictive behavior in Morocco, then
to what extent will the court view addictions to other drugs—like
prescription painkillers, cocaine, or methamphetamine—as similarly
being an insurmountable curtailment on volition? Put differently, at
what point does one’s ability to consciously and freely decide to either
refrain from, or engage in, the use of drugs cross the threshold from
mere choice to physiological compulsion?
Or, digging even deeper, what if a case arose where an alien
purported to be, for example, a pedophile, and was being subjected to
removal to Saudi Arabia, where the government has openly authorized
public beheadings for the crime of “inciting pedophilia.” 119 Pedophilia,
like addiction, is a disease rooted in the mind. 120 Thus, if we adhere to
Id. at 24:15.
Id. at 25:00.
119
Saudi Arabia: The situation of homosexuals, including treatment by authorities and
legal penalties, 16 August 2002, THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY, available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f7d4e1238.html (last visited February 28, 2017).
120
See, e.g., Ryan C.W. Hall & Richard C.W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia:
Definition, Characteristics of Offenders, Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and Forensic Issues, 82
MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 457, 463 (2007) (“A high comorbidity of impulse
control disorders (e.g., explosive personality disorder, kleptomania, pyromania,
pathological gambling) has been noted in pedophiles (30%-55%). These factors have
been postulated to indicate that pedophiles may have neurodevelopmental
perturbations.”); Colleen M. Berryessa, Potential Implications of Research on Genetic or
Heritable Contributions to Pedophilia for the Objectives of Criminal Law, 8 RECENT
ADVANCES DNA & GENE SEQUENCES 65, 68 (2014) (“Even though the biological
117
118

442

2019

Obtaining Relief Under the Convention Against Torture

7:2

the line of logic endorsed in Jamai’s case—i.e., an identifiable cognitive
condition is a reliable indicator of future conduct—then the
hypothetical case of the pedophile being subjected to torture should,
logically speaking, be assessed under the same approach.
But this is where things get tricky. Although the logic holds
true, the legal and moral knock-on effects of granting CAT relief to a
drug addict like Jamai are not the same as those concomitant with
granting relief to a murderer or pedophile. Nevertheless, courts can
sidestep this logical conundrum altogether by focusing solely on the
evidence in the case at issue, and whether the “more likely than not”
standard is satisfied.
C. Recommendation to the Third Circuit
If and when the BIA reexamines Jamai’s case and makes its
decision, it is likely that the Third Circuit’s subsequent decision to
affirm or deny Jamai’s request for CAT relief will carry significant
ramifications. Thus, while other issues in Jamai’s case will impact the
court’s ultimate decision—including whether the legal standard of
torture being “more likely than not” is deemed satisfied—it would be
in the court’s best interest to refrain from making any ill-advised
assertions on drug addiction.
At the core of this question is the notion of free will, and
specifically the extent to which a heroin addiction impedes autonomy.
In this day and age, there is an abundance of evidence demonstrating
that repeated heroin use changes the physical structure of the brain,
thereby creating “long-term imbalances in neuronal and hormonal
systems that are not easily reversed.” 121 In this sense, developing an
facets of the disorder are still not principally determined and very few researchers
study the causes of pedophilia, most scientists now consider the disorder as a
complex deep-rooted predisposition and, over the last few decades, have
correspondingly begun to study possible biological associations to the etiology and
presence of the disorder, such as abnormal brain structure and function [26-31],
irregular hormone levels [32-34], biological vulnerabilities to environmental factors
[35, 36], and . . . genetic influences.”).
121
See What Are the Long-term Effects of Heroin Use?, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON
DRUG
ABUSE,
http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/researchreports/heroin/what-are-long-term-effects-heroin-use (last updated June 2018).
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addiction to heroin parallels a gradual loss in one’s ability to choose
freely, as seeking and using the drug becomes a primary purpose in life.
This understanding sheds light on Jamai’s contention that he will
“always be an addict,” and hence will always have an urge to use heroin.
Today, the scientific community has, by and large, accepted the
“disease model” of addiction. 122 In classifying addiction as a disease as
opposed to a mere habit or craving, this model provides a framework
for exploring “the neurobiological processes associated with the loss
of control, compulsive drug taking, inflexible behaviour, and negative
emotional states associated with addiction.” 123
The upshot of accepting this scientifically-endorsed view of
addiction is that “deeply ingrained values about self-determination and
personal responsibility” that tend to “frame drug use as a voluntary,
hedonistic act” must give way to the understanding that “changes in
the brain can ultimately erode a person’s ability to control the impulse
to take addictive drugs.” 124 Yet, despite a plethora of scientific
evidence, many individuals seem reluctant to accept such a view. Some
scholars have hypothesized that this difficulty may lie in “accepting as
a bona fide disease one that erodes the neuronal circuits that enable us
to exert free will.” 125
This proposition perhaps explains why Judge Sloviter, for
example, insinuated multiple times during oral argument that Jamai
could simply refrain from using drugs in Morocco, and thereby avoid
being subjected to torture. To be sure, Judge Sloviter is correct insofar
as drug use, as opposed to drug addiction, does not necessarily impede
autonomy. But it could also be argued that Judge Sloviter’s position, in
light of the evidence presented in Jamai’s case, parallels Judge
Vomacka’s alarming rationale in the Ali case discussed above, as it was

Nora D. Volkow & George Koob, Brain Disease Model of Addiction: Why Is
It So Controversial? THE LANCET PSYCHIATRY 677, 678 (2015).
123
Id. at 677.
124
Nora D. Volkow et al., Neurobiologic Advances from the Brain Disease Model of
Addiction, 374 N. Engl. J. Med. 363, 364 (2016).
125
Volkow, supra note 122, at 680.
122
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Judge Vomacka who advanced the idea that Ali could avoid torture
simply by abstaining from homosexual behavior.
Fortunately, the Second Circuit recognized that Judge
Vomacka’s line of reasoning was grounded in baseless stereotypes
about homosexuality, and, in overruling his decision, engaged in a
progressive-minded discussion on the innate nature of sexual
identification. In due time, the Third Circuit many be confronted with
an opportunity to follow in its sister court’s progressive footsteps and
dispel disconcerting public attitudes and policies toward the addict. For
the court, Jamai’s case represents an ideal vehicle for jumpstarting a
reformist judicial movement in the realm of drug addiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sparked by the U.N.’s promulgation of the Genocide
Convention in 1948, 126 the international community has made great
strides over the course of the past several decades in combatting the
practice of torture. Today, the effects of this significant human rights
movement can be seen on a global scale, a movement that is due in
large part to the United States’ unwavering adherence to CAT
principles. In particular, American courts have increasingly adhered to
the philosophy that each and every person, regardless of their personal
history, political beliefs, or sexual orientation, deserves to be protected
from being tortured in a foreign land.
Eventually, the Third Circuit may have the opportunity to
revisit Jamai’s case and engage in a meaningful dialogue about the
accepted medical views regarding drug addiction and its curtailment on
volition, and whether drug addicts can refrain from addictive behavior
simply as a matter of choice. If history is any indication, the Third
Circuit—if afforded the opportunity—will apply modern
understandings of autonomy, and, in doing so, uphold the values that
CAT seeks to protect.

126

Genocide Convention, supra note 12.
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